[340] Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938).
[341] Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916).—With four Justices dissenting, the Court, in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), "struck down a State law absolutely prohibiting maintenance of private employment agencies." Commenting on the "constitutional philosophy" thereof in Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949), Justice Black stated that Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), (see p. 997) "clearly undermined Adams v. Tanner."
[342] Liggett (Louis K.) Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
[343] McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 349 (1917). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910).
[344] Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912); Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
[345] Semler v. Oregon State Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935). See also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 427 (1926).
[346] Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
[347] Nashville, C. &. St. L.R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
[348] Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
[349] Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907).
[350] Cargill (W.W.) Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad & W. Commission, 180 U.S. 452 (1901).
[351] Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53 (1916).
[352] Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 185 (1900).
[353] Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937).
[354] Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319 (1925).
[355] Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
[356] Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
[357] McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920).
[358] Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
[359] Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
[360] Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260 (1912).
[361] Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 76-77 (1937), citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 100 (1900); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
[362] Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
[363] Railroad Commission v. Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). See also R.R. Commission v. Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); R.R. Commission v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 311 U.S. 578 (1941).
[364] Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
[365] Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, ibid., 190 (1950).
[366] Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920). See also Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937).
[367] Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
[368] Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933).
[369] Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
[370] Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1908).
[371] Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 279 (1928).
[372] Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
[373] Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 426 (1936).
[374] Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
[375] Miller v. McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261, 264 (1930).
[376] Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936).
[377] Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
[378] Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
[379] Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
[380] Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
[381] Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361 (1904).
[382] Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
[383] Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).
[384] Northwestern Laundry Co. v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916). For a case embracing a rather special set of facts, see Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
[385] Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
[386] Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectaw v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Cusack (Thomas) Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919).
[387] Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberage, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
[388] Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
[389] Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
[390] Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
[391] Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
[392] Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929).
[393] Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
[394] Maguire v. Reardon, 255 U.S. 271 (1921).
[395] Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
[396] Compagnie Francaise de Navigation à Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
[397] Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905).
[398] Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919).
[399] California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
[400] Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 (1913).
[401] Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915).
[402] Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Magnano (A.) Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
[403] North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
[404] Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913).
[405] Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914).
[406] Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929).
[407] Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
[408] Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153 (1916).
[409] Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919).
[410] Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915).
[411] Sage Stores v. Kansas, 323 U.S. 32 (1944).
[412] Weaver v. Palmer Bros Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
[413] Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
[414] Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905).
[415] Stone v. Mississippi ex rel. Harris, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897).
[416] L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
[417] Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
[418] Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912); James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); Barbour v. Georgia, 249 U.S. 454 (1919).
[419] Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887).
[420] Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
[421] Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
[422] Stanley v. Public Utilities Commission, 295 U.S. 76 (1935).
[423] Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
[424] Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925).
[425] Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
[426] Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
[427] Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
[428] Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
[429] Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
[430] Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
[431] Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See also Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928); Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
[432] Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 564 (1942).
[433] Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1944).
[434] Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). Justice Jackson and Douglas dissented on the ground that New York is attempting to escheat unclaimed funds not located either actually or constructively in New York and which are the property of beneficiaries who may never have been citizens or residents of New York.
[435] 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
[436] Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
[437] Angle v. Chicago, St. P.M. & O.R. Co., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).
[438] Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442, 448 (1932).
[439] Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).
[440] Shriver v. Woodbine Sav. Bank, 285 U.S. 467 (1932).
[441] Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-316 (1945).
[442] Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
[443] Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).
[444] Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
[445] Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
[446] Louisiana ex rel. Folsom Bros. v. New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 289 (1883).
[447] Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
[448] Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
[449] Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915).
[450] Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901); Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U.S. 396 (1901).
[451] Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 119 (1910).
[452] Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1875); Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).
[453] Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improv. Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
[454] Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
[455] Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
[456] Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920).
[457] Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improv. Dist, 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
[458] Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
[459] Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).
[460] Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 99 (1935).
[461] Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881).
[462] Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937). A taxpayer therefore cannot contest the imposition of an income tax on the ground that, in operation, it returns to his town less income tax than he and its other inhabitants pay.—Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589 (1921).
[463] Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140, 141 (1925).
[464] Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U.S. 543 (1906).
[465] Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525 (1912).
[466] Salomon v. State Tax Commission, 278 U.S. 484 (1929).
[467] Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278 (1902); Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466 (1907).
[468] Nickel v. Cole, 256 U.S. 222, 226 (1921).
[469] Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
[470] Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936).
[471] Whitney v. State Tax Com., 309 U.S. 530, 540(1940).
[472] Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
[473] Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
[474] Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-150 (1938).
[475] Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
[476] New York, P. & N. Teleg. Co. v. Dolan, 265 U.S. 96 (1924).
[477] Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936).
[478] Nashville, O. & St. L. Ky. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
[479] Paddell v. New York, 211 U.S. 446 (1908).
[480] Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
[481] Butters v. Oakland, 263 U.S. 162 (1923).
[482] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Western Crawford Road Improv. Dist., 266 U.S. 187 (1924). See also Roberts v. Richland Irrig. Co., 289 U.S. 71 (1933) in which it was also stated that an assessment to pay the general indebtedness of an irrigation district is valid, even though in excess of the benefits received.
[483] Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist, 239 U.S. 254 (1915).
[484] Road Improv. Dist. v. Missouri P.R. Co., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).
[485] Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Road Improv. Dist., 266 U.S. 379 (1924).
[486] Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905).
[487] Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia & St. M. Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478 (1916).
[488] Wagner v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207 (1915).
[489] Charlotte Harbor & N.R. Co. v. Welles, 260 U.S. 8 (1922).
[490] Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905). See also Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
[491] Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
[492] New York ex rel. New York, C. & H.R.R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
[493] Wheeling Steel Corp v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209-210 (1936); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 207 (1905); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
[494] Robert L. Howard, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: A Twelve Year Cycle, 8 Missouri Law Review 155, 160-162 (1943); Ralph T. Rawlins, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: Some Modern Aspects, 18 Texas Law Review 296, 314-315 (1940).
[495] Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 498 (1879).
[496] Savings & L. Soc. v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421 (1898).
[497] Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133, 141 (1900).
[498] Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U.S. 54 (1917).
[499] Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U.S. 184 (1916).
[500] Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 109 (1921).
[501] Hawley v. Maiden, 232 U.S. 1, 12 (1914).
[502] First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937).
[503] Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938).
[504] Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
[505] Wisconsin Gas Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 526 (1944).
[506] New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
[507] Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376 (1931).
[508] Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907).
[509] Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
[510] Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 496-497 (1947).
[511] 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
[512] 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
[513] Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1985).
[514] Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140-141 (1925).
[515] 199 U.S. 194 (1905).—In dissenting in State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 185 (1942), Justice Jackson asserted that a reconsideration of this principle had become timely.
[516] 268 U.S. 473 (1925). See also Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934).
[517] 240 U.S. 625, 631 (1916).—A decision rendered in 1920 which is seemingly in conflict was Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, in which North Carolina was prevented from taxing the exercise of a power of appointment through a will executed therein by a resident, when the property was a trust fund in Massachusetts created by the will of a resident of the latter State. One of the reasons assigned for this result was that by the law of Massachusetts the property involved was treated as passing from the original donor to the appointee. However, this holding was overruled in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
[518] 233 U.S. 434 (1914).
[519] Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926).
[520] 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
[521] First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 330-331 (1932).
[522] 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
[523] 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
[524] 281 U.S. 586 (1930).—In dissenting, Justice Holmes observed that Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U.S. 434 (1914), previously mentioned, apparently joined Blackstone v. Miller on the "Index Expurgatorius."
[525] 282 U.S. 1 (1930).
[526] 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
[527] 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
[528] 307 U.S. 357, 363, 366-368, 372 (1939).
[529] 308 U.S. 313 (1939).
[530] 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
[531] Ibid. 386.
[532] 315 U.S. 657, 660, 661 (1942).
[533] 4 Wheat. 316, 429 (1819).
[534] 319 U.S. 94 (1943).
[535] 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
[536] Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936). See also Memphis Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 652 (1942).
[537] Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
[538] Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
[539] Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U.S. 325 (1920).
[540] Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board, 307 U.S. 313, 318, 324 (1939). Although the eight judges affirming this tax were not in agreement as to the reasons to be assigned in justification of this result, the holding appears to be in line with the dictum uttered by the late Chief Justice Stone in Curry v. McCanless (307 U.S. at 368) to the effect that the taxation of a corporation by a State where it does business, measured by the value of the intangibles used in its business there, does not preclude the State of incorporation from imposing a tax measured by all its intangibles.
[541] Delaware L. & W.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905).
[542] Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
[543] Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U.S. 227 (1916); Kansas City, M. & B.R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916).
[544] Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88 (1923).
[545] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56 (1910); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918).
[546] Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929).
[547] St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Arkansas ex rel. Norwood, 235 U.S. 350 (1914).
[548] Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937).
[549] American Mfg Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). Nor does a State license tax on the production of electricity violate the due process clause because it may be necessary, to ascertain, as an element in its computation, the amounts delivered in another jurisdiction.—Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
[550] James v. Dravo Contracting Co. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
[551] Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
[552] Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
[553] Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
[554] 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
[555] Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
[556] Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294-297, 307 (1944).—The case was said to be governed by New York Central Railroad v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 596 (1906). As to the problem of multiple taxation of such airplanes, which had in fact been taxed proportionately by other States, the Court declared that the "taxability of any part of this fleet by any other State than Minnesota, in view of the taxability of the entire fleet by that State, is not now before us." Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, would treat Minnesota's right [to tax as] exclusive of any similar right elsewhere.
[557] Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
[558] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
[559] Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920).—For example, the ratio of track mileage within the taxing State to total track mileage cannot be employed in evaluating that portion of total railway property found in said State when the cost of the lines in the taxing State was much less than in other States and the most valuable terminals of the railroad were located in other States. See also Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904); Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
[560] Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929).
[561] Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
[562] Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
[563] Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
[564] New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
[565] Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).
[566] Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938).
[567] Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
[568] Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
[569] Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
[570] Matson Nav. Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936).
[571] Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 448-449 (1940). Dissenting, Justice Roberts, along with Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds and Reed, stressed the fact that the use and disbursement by the corporation at its home office of income derived from operations in many States does not depend on, and cannot be controlled by, any law of Wisconsin. The act of disbursing such income as dividends, he contended, is "one wholly beyond the reach of Wisconsin's sovereign power, one which it cannot effectively command, or prohibit or condition." The assumption that a proportion of the dividends distributed is paid out of earnings in Wisconsin for the year immediately preceding payment is arbitrary and not borne out by the facts. Accordingly, "if the exaction is an income tax in any sense it is such upon the stockholders [many of whom are nonresidents] and is obviously bad."—See also Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining Co., 311 U.S. 452 (1940).
[572] Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
[573] Equitable L. Assur. Soc. v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143 (1915).
[574] Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103 (1915).
[575] Continental Co. v. Tennessee, 311 U.S. 5, 6 (1940), (Emphasis supplied).
[576] Palmetto F. Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 272 U.S. 295 (1926).
[577] St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
[578] Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
[579] Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907).
[580] Board of Assessors v. New York L. Ins. Co., 216 U.S. 517 (1910).
[581] Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346 (1911).
[582] Orient Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 358 (1911).
[583] Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 58 (1902); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).
[584] McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).
[585] Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890).
[586] Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905).
[587] Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 709-710 (1884).
[588] Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 710 (1884).
[589] McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).
[590] Taylor v. Secor, (State Railroad Tax Cases), 92 U.S. 575, 610 (1876).
[591] Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934). See also Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120 (1914).
[592] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
[593] Michigan C.R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 302 (1906).
[594] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Board of Public Works, 172 U.S. 32, 45 (1898).
[595] St. Louis & K.C. Land Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U.S. 419, 430 (1916); Paulson v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 41 (1893); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 590 (1897).
[596] Tonawanda v. Lyon, 161 U.S. 389, 391 (1901).
[597] Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
[598] Withnell v. Ruecking Constr. Co., 249 U.S. 63, 68 (1919); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 405 (1926). Likewise, the committing to a board of county supervisors of authority to determine, without notice or hearing, when repairs to an existing drainage system are necessary cannot be said to deny due process of law to landowners in the district, who, by statutory requirement, are assessed for the cost thereof in proportion to the original assessments.—Breiholz v. Pocahontas County, 257 U.S. 118 (1921).
[599] Fallbrook Irrig. District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 168, 175 (1896); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U S. 396, 405 (1926).
[600] Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 109 (1934); French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 341 (1901). See also Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).
[601] Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 321 (1903).
[602] Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 488 (1919).—Likewise, a taxpayer does not have a right to a hearing before a State board of equalization preliminary to issuance by it of an order increasing the valuation of all property in a city by 40%.—Bi-Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
[603] Detroit v. Parker, 181 U.S. 399 (1901).
[604] Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 38 (1893).
[605] Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). See also Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co. v. Kentucky (Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases), 115 U.S. 321, 331 (1885); Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 537 (1895); Merchants' & Mfgrs. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461, 466 (1897); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).
[606] Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466, 478 (1905).
[607] Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1904).
[608] Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 212 U.S. 152 (1909). See also Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908).
[609] Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
[610] Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).
[611] Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). See also Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
[612] Farncomb v. Denver, 252 U.S. 7 (1920).
[613] Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23 (1914).
[614] Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647 (1923).
[615] National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914).
[616] Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924).
[617] Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910).
[618] Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1920).
[619] League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).
[620] Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 669 (1890).
[621] Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
[622] King v. Mullins, 171 U.S. 404 (1898); Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915).
[623] Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
[624] Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878).
[625] Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).
[626] League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 (1902). See also Straus v. Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162 (1913).
[627] Exercisable as to every description of property, tangibles and intangibles including choses in action, contracts, and charters, but only for a public purpose, the power of eminent domain may also be conferred by the State upon municipal corporations, public utilities, and even upon individuals. Like every other governmental power, the power of eminent domain cannot be surrendered by the State or its subdivisions either by contract or by any other means.—Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); Offield v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 203 U.S. 372 (1906); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, 260 U.S. 473 (1923).
[628] Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920).
[629] 7 Pet. 243.
[630] 96 U.S. 97, 105.
[631] 166 U.S. 226, 233, 236-237 (1897); see also Sweet v: Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398 (1895).
[632] Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908).
[633] Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 240 (1920); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).
[634] Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).
[635] United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-552, 556-558 (1946), citing Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946), and New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)—Concurring in the result, Justice Frankfurter insisted that "the fact that the nature of the subject matter gives the legislative determination nearly immunity from judicial review does not mean that the power to review is wanting." Also concurring in the result, Justice Reed, for himself and Chief Justice Stone, dissented from that portion of the opinion which suggested that "there is no judicial review" of the question whether a "taking is for a public purpose."
[636] Justice Reed concurring in United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 557 (1946).
[637] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57-59 (1919).—It is no longer open to question that the State legislature may confer upon a municipality the authority to determine such necessity for itself.—Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923).
[638] Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
[639] Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, 177-178 (1872); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also comparable cases involving the Federal Government and discussed under the Fifth Amendment, United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See also the cases hereinafter discussed on the limitations on "uncompensated takings."
[640] Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897)
[641] Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
[642] Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
[643] Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v.. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
[644] Hendersonville Light & Power Co. v.. Blue Ridge Interurban R. Co., 243 U.S. 563 (1917).
[645] Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191, 193 (1929).
[646] Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
[647] Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
[648] Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928).
[649] Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 151, 153 (1906). See also Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 20-21 (1885).
[650] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Nebraska ex rel. Board of Transportation, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896). The State court in this case was declared to have acknowledged that the taking was not for a public use. Hence, its reversal by the Supreme Court did not conflict with the later observation by the Court that "no case is recalled where this Court has condemned * * * a taking upheld by the State court as a taking for public uses in conformity with its laws."—See Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).
[651] Backus (A.) Jr. and Sons v. Port Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 573, 575 (1898).
[652] McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363, 370-371 (1913).
[653] Ibid. 371.
[654] Provo Bench Canal and Irrig. Co. v. Tanner, 239 U.S. 323 (1915); Appleby v. Buffalo, 221 U.S. 524 (1911).
[655] Backus (A.) Jr. and Sons v. Port Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 569 (1898).
[656] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 250 (1897); McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363, 372 (1913).
[657] Roberts v. New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1935).
[658] Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
[659] Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677 (1923).
[660] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897).
[661] Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 484-485 (1905).
[662] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 252 (1897).
[663] Darling v. Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919).
[664] Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879). See also Marchant v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 153 U.S. 380 (1894).
[665] Meyer v. Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 (1898). For cases illustrative of the types of impairment or flooding consequent upon erection of dams or aids to navigation which have been deemed to amount to a taking for which compensation must be paid, see Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166 (1872); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
[666] Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
[667] Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
[668] Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-414 (1922). For comparable cases involving the Federal Government see Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
[669] Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 483 (1924).
[670] North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925). See also Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919).
[671] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923).
[672] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925).
[673] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919).
[674] Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 695 (1897).
[675] Hays v. Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 238 (1920); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945).
[676] The requirements of due process in tax and eminent domain proceedings are discussed in conjunction with the coverage of these topics. See pp. 1056-1062, 1069.
[677] Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
[678] Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944).
[679] Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).
[680] Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).
[681] McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41 (1877).
[682] R.R. Commission v. Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941). See also Railroad Commission v. Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
[683] Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902).
[684] New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562 (1905).
[685] Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist, 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930).
[686] Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U.S. 293, 297 (1906).
[687] Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46 (1894); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
[688] National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 270 (1904); Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U.S. 463, 471 (1905).
[689] Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
[690] Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).
[691] Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
[692] The jurisdictional requirements for rendering a valid decree in divorce proceedings are considered under the full faith and credit clause, supra, pp. 662-670.
[693] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 122 (1915); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 392, 394 (1914).
[694] Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, (1917). See also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
[695] Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (1874); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
[696] Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889).
[697] Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 193 (1915); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). See also Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892).
[698] Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-464 (1940).
[699] McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
[700] Thus, in an older decision rendered in 1919, the Court held that whereas "States could exclude foreign corporations * * *, and therefore establish * * * [appointment of such an agent] as a condition to letting them in," they had no power to exclude individuals; and as a consequence, a statute was ineffective which treated nonresident partners, by virtue of their having done business therein, as having consented to be bound by service of process on a person who was their employee when the transaction sued on arose but was not their agent at the time of service.—Flexner v. Farson, 248. U.S. 289, 293 (1919).
Because it might be construed to negative extension to nonresidents, other than motorists, of the statutory device upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, the doctrine of Flexner v. Farson, "that the mere transaction of business in a State by a nonresident natural person does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts," was recently condemned as inadequate "to cope with the increasing problem of practical responsibility of hazardous business conducted in absentia * * *"—Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F. (2d) 740, 742 (1944).
[701] Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 20, 24 (1928).
[702] 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
[703] 326 U.S. 310.
[704] Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
[705] In a very few cases, "continuous operations within a State were thought to be so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suits against [a foreign corporation] on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those" operations.—See St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921).
[706] Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907).
[707] Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 129-130 (1915).—In neither this case, nor the preceding decision were the defendant corporations notified of the pendency of the action, service having been made only on the Insurance Commissioner or the Secretary of State.
[708] Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). See also Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 (1923).
[709] Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & M. Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95-96 (1917).
[710] Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923).
[711] Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
[712] Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903).
[713] Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195 (1915).
[714] Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
[715] St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). See St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
[716] Mutual Reserve &c. Assn. v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147, 156 (1903).
[717] Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 365 (1933).
[718] 326 U.S. 310, 317-320 (1945).
[719] This departure was recognized by Justice Rutledge in a subsequent opinion in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422 (1946).
The principle that solicitation of business alone is inadequate to confer jurisdiction for purposes of subjecting a foreign corporation to a suit in personam was established in Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); but was somewhat qualified by the later holding in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) to the effect that when solicitation was connected with other activities (in the latter case, the local agents collected from the customers), a foreign corporation was then doing business within the forum State. Inasmuch as the International Shoe Company, in addition to having its agents solicit orders, also permitted them to rent quarters for the display of merchandise, the observation has been made that the Court, by applying the qualification of the International Harvester Case, could have decided International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) as it did without abandoning the "presence" doctrine.
[720] 326 U.S. 310, 316-317.
[721] Ibid. 319.
[722] 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
[723] Ibid. 647-649.—Concerning the holding in Minnesota Ass'n. v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923), that a similar Minnesota mail order insurance company could not be viewed as doing business in Montana where the claimant-plaintiff lived, and that the circumstances under which its Montana contracts, executed and to be performed in Minnesota, were consummated could not support in implication that the foreign insurer had consented to be sued in Montana, the majority asserted that the "narrow grounds relied on by the Court in the Benn Case cannot be deemed controlling."
Declaring that what is necessary to sustain a suit by a policyholder in Virginia against a foreign insurer is not determinative when the State seeks to regulate solicitation within its borders, Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that it is the nature of the State's action that determines the degree of activity in a State necessary for satisfying the requirements of due process, and that solicitation by existing members operates as though the insurer "had formally designated Virginia members as its agents."
Insisting that "an in personam judgment cannot be based upon service by registered letter on a nonresident corporation or a natural person, neither of whom has ever been" in Virginia, Justice Minton, with whom Justice Jackson was associated in a dissenting opinion, would have dismissed the appeal on the ground that "Virginia has not claimed the power to require [the insurer] * * * to appoint the Secretary of State as their agent for service of process, nor have [its] courts rendered judgment in a suit where service was made in that manner." He would therefore let Virginia "go through this shadow-boxing performance in order to publicize the activities of" the insurer.—Justices Reed and Frankfurter joined this dissent on the merits.—Ibid. 655-656, 658, 659.
In Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) it was held, that the State of Ohio was free either to open its courts, or to refuse to do so, to a foreign corporation owning gold and silver mines in the Philippine Islands, but temporarily (during Japanese occupation) carrying on a part of its general business in Ohio, including directors meetings, business correspondence, banking, etc. Two members of the Court dissented, contending that what it was doing was "giving gratuitously an advisory opinion to the Ohio Supreme Court. [They] would dismiss the writ [of certiorari] as improvidently granted." The case is obviously too atypical to offer much promise of importance as a precedent.
[724] Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890).
[725] Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254 (1907); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
[726] Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 203 (1899); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
[727] American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911).
[728] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); citing Boswell v. Otis, 9 How. 336 (1850); Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 (1870). Such remedy, by way of example, is also available to a wife who is enabled thereby to impound local bank deposits of her absent husband for purposes of collecting unpaid instalments by him. Moreover, because of the antiquity of the procedure authorized, a statute permitting the impounding of property of an absconding father for the maintenance of his children is not in conflict with due process because it fails to provide for notice, actual or constructive, to the absconder.—Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917); Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 222 (1930). Likewise, proceedings to attach wages in execution of a judgment for debt may be instituted without any notice or service on the judgment debtor. The latter, having had his day in court when the judgment was rendered, is not entitled to be apprized of what action the judgment creditor may elect to take to enforce collection.—Endicott Co. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).
[729] Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).
[730] McCaughey v. Lyall, 224 U.S. 558 (1912).
[731] RoBards v. Lamb, 127 U.S. 58, 61 (1888). Inasmuch as it is within the power of a State to provide that one who has undertaken administration of an estate shall remain subject to the order of its courts until said administration is closed, it follows that there can be no question as to the validity of a judgment for unadministered assets obtained on service of publication plus service personally upon an executor in the State in which he had taken refuge and in which he had been adjudged incompetent.—Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913). Also, when a mother petitions for her appointment as guardian, and no one but the mother and her infant son of tender years, are concerned, failure to serve notice of the petition upon the infant does not invalidate the proceedings resulting in her appointment.—Jones v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195 (1927). Also a Pennsylvania statute which establishes a special procedure for appointment of one to administer the estate of absentees, which procedure is distinct from that contained in the general law governing settlement of decedents' estates and provides special safeguards to protect the rights of absentees is not repugnant to the due process clause because it authorizes notice by publication after an absence of seven years.—Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905).
[732] Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 275 (1896).
[733] Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
[734] Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
[735] Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
[736] Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941).
[737] Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 395-396 (1914).
[738] Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236 (1914).
[739] Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908); Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261, 265 (1912).
[740] Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). For the procedural requirements that must be observed in the passage of legislation levying special assessments or establishing assessment districts, see pp. 1058-1059.
[741] Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Com'n., 24 F. Supp. 370 (1938); Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 Harvard Law Review, 259 (1938).
Whether action of an administrative agency, which voluntarily affords notice and hearing in proceedings in which due process would require the same, is voided by the fact that the statute in pursuance of which it operates does not expressly provide such protection, is a question as to which the Supreme Court has developed no definitive answer. It appears to favor the doctrine enunciated by State courts to the effect that such statutes are to be construed as impliedly requiring notice and hearing, although, in a few instances, it has uttered comments rejecting this notice-by-implication theory.—See Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 281 U.S. 643 (1930); Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30 (1893); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U.S. 321 (1885). Contra: Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
[742] Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
[743] North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-316 (1908). For an exposition of the doctrine applicable for determining the tort liability of administrative officers, see Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540 (1891).
[744] Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
[745] 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
[746] Ibid. 140-141.
[747] Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246-247 (1944).
[748] Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
[749] Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Baker v. Baker, E. & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403 (1917); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
[750] American Surety Co v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
[751] Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
[752] See footnote 1, p. 1085.
[753] Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
[754] Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 407, 409 (1900).
[755] Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909). One may, of course, waive a right to notice and hearing, as in the case of a debtor or surety who consents to the entry of a confessed judgment on the happening of certain conditions.—Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932).
[757] Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
[758] Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263 (1904); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912). The power of a State to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them and to deny access to its courts, in the exercise of its right to regulate practice and procedure; is also subject to the restrictions imposed by the contract, full faith and credit, and privileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
[759] Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Iowa C.R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896); Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937).
[760] Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904).
[761] Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not constrain the States to accept modern doctrines of equity, or adopt a combined system of law and equity procedure, or dispense with all necessity for form and method in pleading, or give untrammeled liberty to make amendments.
[762] Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
[763] Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
[764] Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924).
[765] York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman v. Wooters, 138 U.S. 285, 287 (1891).
[766] Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915).
[767] Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).—Consistently, with due process, a State may provide that the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant shall not bar recovery in actions brought against an employer for death or injury resulting from dangerous machinery improperly safeguarded. A person having no vested right to the defense of contributory negligence, a State may take it away altogether, or may provide that said defense, as well as that of assumption of risk, are questions of fact to be left to the jury.—Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34 (1917); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 55 (1919); Herron v. Southern P. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
[768] Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U.S. 154 (1903).
[769] Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 259 (1907).
[770] Missouri K. & T.R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914).
[771] Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896).
[772] Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1922); Hartford L. Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129, 139 (1921); Life & C. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).
[773] Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114 (1927).
[774] Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 663, 665 (1907).
[775] Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 156 (1911).